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BEWARE THE DOTTED LINE: FORECLOSURE RESCUE 
FRAUD IN MARYLAND AND THE GROWING EFFORT TO 
COMBAT IT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If you are reading this, chances are that freedom of contract is a 
principle that plays a central role in your life. 
There is a very basic reason for this. You are a practitioner of the 
law. To contract one must communicate, and for that one needs 
language. Human language, in all its flexibility and pliability, is what 
makes it possible for our contractual relationships to manifest the 
same balance between determinacy and adaptability that our ever-
changing circumstances exhibit. This mutability is also what makes 
lawyers essential to any free society. To paraphrase Reinhold 
Niebuhr, interpretation of words makes advocacy possible, and its 
potential for abuse makes advocacy necessary. I 
Those who would abuse freedom of contract, it stands to reason, 
seek out situations where an imbalance of the ability to use this 
freedom can work to their advantage. 2 So it is with the growin¥ 
phenomenon known generally as foreclosure rescue fraud (FRF). 
1. Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian by training, was one of the twentieth century's 
leading political thinkers. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in 
American Political Thought and Life, in REINHOLD NIEHBUHR: HIS RELIGIOUS, 
SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 125 (Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretail eds., 
1956). In a book Niebuhr wrote against the backdrop of both communism and 
fascism, id. at 137, \39, 145, he penned the line, "[mlan's capacity for justice makes 
democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." 
REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LiGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS xi 
(1944). 
2. 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 29.4, at 393 (rev. ed. 2002). 
3. MARYLAND CONSUMER RIGHTS COALITION, PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP: THE 
CHALLENGE OF PREVENTING ABUSIVE LENDING AND FORECLOSURE PRACTICES 22 
(2006) [hereinafter PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP]. Foreclosure Rescue Fraud (FRF) 
refers to a variety of scams that target homeowners facing foreclosure. The 
foreclosure consultant convinces the homeowner that he can help the homeowner 
rescue the home from foreclosure. There are several variations of FRF. For 
example, the foreclosure consultant may induce the homeowner to sign confusing 
paperwork that enables the scammer to drain the equity from the house or to transfer 
ownership of the property and may evict the unsuspecting homeowner. ld. 
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While FRF takes several different forms4 and, like any genuinely 
malignant thing, tends to mutate in response to changing conditions, 5 
an example at this point should be helpful. 
Consider the hypothetical situation of Linda. She is forty-five 
years old and owns a two-bedroom house in a lower-middle-class 
community. She has been divorced for the past seven years; her two 
children are both in their early twenties, and independent. Three 
years ago, Linda was diagnosed with breast cancer. A secretary by 
trade and training, she had to leave her job for a part-time position 
that was more compatible with the demands of her chemotherapy 
schedule. 
Fortunately for Linda, her cancer has gone into remission. Her 
financial health, however, has taken a turn for the worse. Her 
weakened physical state has made full-time employment an 
unrealistic option and her current employer's health insurance 
package requires hefty co-payments. Having drained the relatively 
small amount of money she had saved, Linda finds that she is 
essentially insolvent. Unless she chooses not to eat, her regular 
income simply does not equal her monthly expenses. 
As a result, she has fallen several months behind in her mortgage 
payments. Feeling that she has little hope of bringing her mortgage 
current anytime soon, Linda has not contacted her lender. What 
would she tell them-that she cannot afford her bills? She figures 
they already know that. 6 Having neither heard nor received payment 
from Linda in several months, her lender decides to foreclose on her 
home. 
On October 10th, Linda receives a notice in the mail from her 
lender informing her that her home will be auctioned off at a 
foreclosure sale on October 20th.7 Needless to say, this comes as a 
4. STEVE TRIPOLI & ELIZABETH RENUART, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., DREAMS 
FORECLOSED: THE RAMPANT THEFT OF AMERICANS' HOMES THROUGH EQUITY-
STRIPPING FORECLOSURE "RESCUE" SCAMS 8 (2005). See infra Part II.D. for an in-
depth discussion of the three basic types ofFRF. 
5. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 9. 
6. A mistake that many homeowners in distress make is not contacting their lender as 
soon as it becomes apparent that they are going to fall behind on their payments. 
Reputable lenders are often willing to work with such mortgagors in fashioning 
solutions to cash flow problems. For example, some lenders will extend the term of a 
mortgage, thus lowering the monthly payments. Such steps are often less expensive 
for the lender than the foreclosure process is. Ellen Simon, Assoc. Press, Allies 
Against Foreclosure, STAR LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Apr. 6, 2007, at 23. 
7. See infra Part II.E for a description of foreclosure procedures in Maryland. Section 
7-105(a-I)(3)(i) of the Maryland Real Property Code made this procedure marginally 
less onerous by requiring lenders to inform distressed borrowers within two days of 
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rude shock. While she knew she was behind on her payments, Linda 
had hoped that if she could scrape together at least a partial payment 
over the next month or so, she might at least buy herself some time. 
In any event, she had not received any notice from a court of law that 
the foreclosure process had even begun. Unbt-knownst to her, 
Maryland law does not mandate that a homeowner be informed by 
the court of record that a foreclosure petition has been filed. 8 
In fact, a few days before Linda received the bad news in the mail, 
Jim, an ethically deficient entrepreneur (EDE), had already learned of 
her plight. 9 He did not learn of it by accident. One way that EDEs 
find potential prey is by scanning public records for homes that are in 
foreclosure. Upon seeing Linda's property among those slated for the 
"chopping block," Jim immediately highlighted it as a likely target. 
Linda's home is in an area with a relatively stable population. This 
indicates to Jim that there is a good chance Linda has built up a 
significant amount of equity in her home. lo 
Equity is the difference between what a homeowner owes on her 
house and the house's fair market value. I I Linda bought her home 
fifteen years ago with her then-husband. The home cost them 
$100,000. After a down payment of $10,000, Linda and her husband 
took out a loan for the remaining $90,000. Today, the home is in 
Linda's name pursuant to her divorce, and only $15,000 remains to 
be paid on her mortgage. The fair-market value of her house has 
risen from $100,000 fifteen years ago to $190,000 today. 
Therefore, although Linda is cash poor, she has $175,000 in equity 
in her home. This is what Jim is going to target. Figuring that Linda 
will learn of the scheduled foreclosure sale about ten days before it is 
to take place,12 Jim decides to approach her in person on October 
11 th, nine days before the sale is slated to occur. He picks this date 
for several reasons. 
filing a petition for foreclosure with the circuit court in which the property at issue is 
located. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105(a-I)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2003 & 
Supp. 2006); see also infra Part III. In practice, this would alter Linda's scenario by 
giving her sixteen, rather than ten days notice. 
8. See infra Part ILE. 
9. Present writer will, for the most part, refer to those who practice FRF as ethically 
deficient entrepreneurs (EDEs). 
10. For a more comprehensive account of the role equity plays in FRF, see infra Part 
ILB. 
II. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (8th ed. 2004). 
12. REAL PROP. § 7-105(b)(2)(ii). The statute states "[t]he notice [of foreclosure sale] 
shall state the time, place, and terms of the sale and shall be sent not earlier than 30 
days and not later than 10 days before the date of sale." Id. 
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First, he is reasonably certain Linda will have received the 
foreclosure sale notice by then. This is crucial to him, because he 
wants Linda to be truly desperate when he approaches her. Second, 
Jim does not want to wait too long before making his initial move. 
He knows that the number of EDEs operating on a regular basis in 
Maryland has reached the triple digits and appears to be growing. 13 
Finally, Jim likes contacting potential marks about nine days before a 
scheduled foreclosure sale because the short time window works to 
his advantage. 14 
When Linda answers the knock on her door, she sees a man who 
appears clean-cut, well-dressed in a business suit, and possessing an 
empathetic manner. Jim informs her that he owns a small firm that 
specializes in helping homeowners who are in precisely her situation. 
He tells Linda that his friend who works for the local circuit court 
helped put him in touch with her. Linda is neither stupid nor naIve, 
but she is terrified at the prospect of losing her home. Simply hearing 
that there is hope that this might not happen elevates her mood, and 
she invites Jim into her house. 
Jim initiates a discussion of Linda's general financial situation, but 
what he really wants to know is how much equity she has in the 
house. When he learns that Linda does in fact have quite a bit of 
equity in the home, he knows she is just the sort of target he likes. 
He has her fill out an application that he fully intends to throw out 
once he gets back to his office. The point of this step is to delay the 
process for a few days. If Jim can convince Linda that it will take, 
say, four days to determine whether his firm can help her, then time 
will truly be on his side when the time comes to get Linda's signature 
on some documents he plans to present to her. The greater the stress 
she is under, the lesser the chance she will examine or even read them 
before signing. 
Linda is very relieved when Jim calls to tell her that he can help 
her. She agrees to meet him the following day at his office. It is now 
October 16th, four days before Linda is due to lose her home. While 
Jim's tone still seems to reflect concern about Linda's situation, he 
exudes a greater sense of urgency than he did during their initial 
meeting. 
The first thing Jim tells Linda is that time is absolutely of the 
essence. He is willing to help, but the firm's resources are limited. If 
13. Interview with Mike Morin, Attorney, in Severn, Maryland (Nov. 27, 2006) 
[hereinafter Morin Interview]. In fact, as Morin points out, the FRF scam has 
become sufficiently popular in Maryland that some EDEs are actively teaching it to 
others. Id. 
14. See PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 20-21. 
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Linda does not act quickly, there are two other homeowners in 
similar situations who could take Linda's place. Jim explains that 
Linda will sign a quitclaim deed ls on the house over to his firm, New 
Beginnings, Inc. (NB). Using his firm's solid credit history, he will 
obtain a loan that will enable Linda to bring her mortgage current and 
thereby avoid foreclosure. While the home will "technically," as Jim 
puts it, be in NB' s name, Linda will remain in the home and continue 
to make monthly mortgage payments. 
As Jim explains this to Linda, he flips through a large stack of 
documents he has placed in front of her. Most of the documents 
contain terms that are entirely superfluous and worded in a 
deliberately confusing way.16 The bigger the stack, Jim knows, the 
less likely it is that Linda will take on the daunting challenge of 
actually reading it. Buried in the volume of verbiage which Linda 
affixes her signature is a clause stating that in order to repurchase her 
home from NB, she must pay the full amount remaining on her 
mortgage within nine months of the date that NB acquired the deed 
from her. 
What Jim actually tells Linda is that she will pay NB an amount 
roughly equal to what she used to pay her original mortgage lender. 
This money will be applied to pay down her mortgage and will also 
count toward an eventual repurchase of her home. He will also stress 
to her that if she does not sign the relevant documents today, there 
might not be sufficient time to secure the loan necessary to bring her 
mortgage current. Feeling she has no real choice at this point, Linda 
signs where she is told. 
For three months Linda is able to make her monthly payments to 
Jim, sometimes skipping meals in order to do so. Not surprisingly, 
though, she begins to fall behind in her payments. Five months after 
she signed awal her home to NB, Linda learns that Jim, acting as 
NB's "agent,,,1 has begun eviction proceedings against her.18 She 
15. A quitclaim deed is a deed that "conveys a grantor's complete interest or claim in 
certain real property but that neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 446. In this situation, Linda gives up 
her claim of title to her home by signing the quitclaim deed. The quitclaim deed 
effectively conveys ownership of Linda's home to NB without any warranty that the 
title is valid. See 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 17 (2001). 
16. See TRIPOLI & RENUART,supra note 4, at 10. 
17. Agency is a "fiduciary relationship created ... [where] one party (the agent) may act 
on behalf of another party (the principal) and bind that other party by words or 
actions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 67. As NB's "agent" Jim is 
able to bring eviction proceedings on behalf ofNB, the "principal." See id. 
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appears at her county's district court on the appointed date and 
attempts to inform the judge that she is not really renting the home 
but, rather, is in the process of repurchasing it. The judge responds 
that Maryland law limits a district court's jurisdiction to landlord-
tenant disputes. 19 Therefore, any issues involving ownership of 
Linda's home fall outside his court's jurisdiction. 20 
After Jim presents the judge with a copy of Linda's lease and the 
judge quickly looks over the terms contained within it, the court sets 
an eviction date. 21 Unable to redeem her "lease" before the eviction 
date, Linda is evicted from her home by a group of constables from 
the local sheriffs office. 22 Had she been able to make her payments 
to Jim for the full nine months, he would have evicted her at that 
point. Once Linda agreed to accept his "help," her fate was sealed. 
Jim sells the home for $175,000. In the end, the only money he 
had to spend in order to gain title to Linda's home was the $3,000 it 
took to bring her mortgage current. His profit thus comes to 
$172,000. 
As for Linda, she remains liable for the unpaid balance on her 
mortgage, which at this point is around $13,500. NB took title to her 
house, but buried in the stack of documents she signed was a clause 
providing that the original mortgage would still be her responsibility. 
This is one form that FRF has taken in Maryland and across the 
country.23 While the exact scope of the problem remains unknown, 
attorneys general, enforcement officials, and lawyers representing 
18. Now that NB owns Linda's home, she is no longer a homeowner, but a tenant who 
can be evicted for failure to pay rent. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006). NB, now Linda's landlord, begins eviction 
proceedings by filing a written complaint in the district court of the county where 
Linda's home is located. Id. § 8-301(b)(l). The district court then notifies Linda that 
the trial will be held five business days after the filing of NB' s complaint. Id. § 8-
401(b)(3). 
19. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-401(4) (LexisNexis 2006). 
20. Id. § 4-402(b) ("Except as provided in § 4-401 ... , the District Court does not have 
jurisdiction to decide the ownership of real property or of an interest in real 
property."). 
21. If Linda cannot pay the rent and late fees she owes, the court will order that 
possession of the premises be given to NB within four days after the trial. MD. CODE 
ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401 (c)(3) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
22. REAL PROP. § 8-402.1(b)(I) (LexisNexis 2003) ("If the court determines that the 
tenant breached the terms of the lease ... the court shall ... issue its warrant to the 
sheriff ... commanding the tenant to deliver possession to the landlord .... "). 
23. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8-9. "The predominant foreclosure 'rescue' 
scams appear to come in three varieties": phantom help, bailout, and bait-and-switch. 
Id. Examples of these rescue scams have been reported in several states and the 
District of Columbia. Id. 
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injured parties all agree that the practice of FRF is widespread and 
growing. 24 In a June 2005 report, the National Consumer Law 
Center stated that nationwide "thousands upon thousands" of 
vulnerable homeowners had fallen victim to FRF. 25 According to 
Mike Morin, an attorney who has represented several victims of FRF, 
the problem is "rife" in Maryland, particularly in the Washington, 
D.C.-Baltimore corridor. 26 In fact, he states that the problem has 
become so common that there are "hobby con artists" perpetrating 
FRF in their spare time. 27 
Advocates and government officials in Maryland echo Morin's 
view. 28 It was reported that as of September 2006 there were more 
than 30,000 households delinquent on their mortga:ffies.29 Of course, 
not all of these people will end up in foreclosure. However, it is 
highly likely that as middle-class incomes continue to stagnate and 
holders of sub-prime home loans encounter interest rate increases and 
balloon payments, many of them will in fact become prime targets for 
EDEs.31 
The drive to put an end to FRF picked up momentum in May 2005 
when Governor Ehrlich signed into law emergency legislation aimed 
squarely at EDEs and their fraudulent activities. 32 The Maryland 
Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act (PHF A)33 is an 
essential first step in eventually, one hopes, wiping out FRF in 
Maryland. Before its enactment, the most skilled EDEs were able to 
strip distressed homeowners of their equity in ways that arguably 
were legal. For example, under the PHFA, Jim's hypothetical 
swindling of Linda would be illegal, whereas before its passage he 
may well have been able to achieve a similar result using means that 
could have withstood judicial scrutiny. 34 
24. See id. at 15. 
25. !d. at 7. 
26. Jamie Smith Hopkins, State Warns of Foreclosure 'Consultants,' BALT. SUN, Sept. 
26, 2006, at 1 C. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. 
30. Id. 
31. See id.; see also infra Part II.C (discussing predatory lending). 
32. DOYLE NIEMANN, NEW PROTECTIONS FOR HOMEOWNERS IN FORECLOSURE 1 (n.d.). 
33. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to -302, 7-305 to -308, 7-310 to -311,7-314 to 
-315,7-318 to -321 (LexisNexis Supp.2006). 
34. He might have done this by softening the repayment terms such that while a court 
would be unlikely to find them substantively unconscionable, Linda would still have 
been all but assured of eventually losing her home. See TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra 
note 4, at 45. He also could have inoculated himself against claims of procedural 
120 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 37 
An excellent first step, though, is just that-a first step. While the 
PHF A makes it much more difficult for EDEs to ply their pernicious 
trade without breaking the lawj there are potential loopholes in the 
statute that should be closed. 5 Present writer will argue in this 
Comment that violation of PHF A should be a felony rather than a 
misdemeanor. 36 He will also argue that provisions in PHF A 
exempting several classes of professionals, including real estate and 
mortgage brokers, bankers, and attorneys, should be modified. 37 In 
addition, this Comment will recommend alteration of language in the 
PHF A that, as is, leaves open the possibility that lenders who, 
directly or indirectly, do business with EDEs may enjoy the le~al 
protections afforded to bona fide purchasers (BFP) of real property. 8 
This Comment is intended to be a resource for litigators and a 
primer for advocates, legislators, and government officials who seek 
to prevent FRF from happening in the first place. In furtherance of 
these goals, the Comment addresses the problem of FRF in Maryland 
from a number of perspectives. Section II describes the confluence 
of factors that has helped spawn the growing perpetration of FRF in 
recent years as well as the different forms the scam tends to take. 
Section III analyzes the newly created PHF A. 39 Section IV will 
examine what appear to be the most significant legal issues that 
litigators representing victims of FRF are likely to encounter. In 
Section V, present writer will recommend a series of steps aimed 
both at strengthening efforts to enforce the PHF A and, more 
importantly, preventing FRF from occurring in the first place. 
unconscionability by cutting down on the number of documents he presented to 
Linda and containing within them the required disclosures. Id. His assertions, that 
someone at the court had alerted him to Linda's situation and that he needed Linda to 
sign the documents immediately so that he could take out a loan in order to bring her 
mortgage current were not necessary. Id. at 10. He could have gotten her to sign the 
deed without resorting to them. !d. at 11. 
35. See infra Part III. 
36. See infra Part V.B. 
37. See infra Part V.A. 
38. See infra Part V.c. 
39. See NIEMANN, supra note 32, at 3. 
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II. THE CURRENT CONTEXT: CASH POOR BUT EQUITY 
RICH HOMEOWNERS AND THE PERILS OF CREATIVE 
FINANCING 
A. FRF: The Exploitation of Educational Deficiencies and 
Emotional Stressors 
121 
People who possess the cleverness to exploit emerging 
circumstances but lack the character to harness this talent for 
aboveboard purposes prey upon those who, for any number of 
reasons, are unable to safeguard their own interests. 
The victims of FRF come in all shapes and sizes, they are 
disproportionately poor and undereducated,40 which reduces the 
chances that a potential victim will understand the stack of paperwork 
he is given by an EDE.41 EDEs target people who are in danger of 
losing their homes, often scanning public records for foreclosure 
notices, because potential victims are often at an emotional as well as 
an educational disadvantage.42 The stress attendant upon the 
prospect of imminent homelessness is not conducive to rigorous and 
thorough analysis of proffered contractual terms. 43 
Any effort to combat FRF must ultimately reckon with the fact that 
the freedom to contract, without which our polity would be 
unrecognizable to us, necessarily entails the risk that certain parties 
will exploit superior analytical, tactical, and emotional resources at 
the expense of others. 44 Moving beyond the bringing of EDEs to 
penal and pecuniary justice and toward the prevention of FRF 
altogether will, in certain limited ways, require us to alter the process 
by which some types of real estate transactions are conducted in 
Maryland.45 
However, there is arguably a difference between one investor 
presciently selling a stock to a somewhat less astute party in a timely 
manner, and the sharp dealing that characterizes FRF. The latter 
40. See TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 18. 
41. See id. at 16. 
42. This last point should not be taken to mean that present writer believes EDEs are, by 
and large, a well educated lot. The point is simply that any party who lacks formal 
schooling and intellectual confidence is at least reasonably likely to sign documents 
without fully understanding them and is by definition at an educational disadvantage. 
43. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 51-52. 
44. PERILLO, supra note 2, at 393. 
45. See infra Part V.c. The recommendations contained in Part V are designed not to 
burden Maryland's real estate community with onerous restrictions, but rather to 
provide a limited number of workable ideas that, if implemented, could greatly 
reduce the incidence of FRF in Maryland. 
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activity does little or nothing to advance economic growth in 
Maryland or any other state. Present writer strongly believes that the 
law can provide basic protection and recourse to vulnerable classes 
without spawning anrJhing remotely resembling undue restriction 
upon market freedom. 6 
B. The Centrality of Home Equity 
EDEs feast on homeowners who are short on cash flow but rich in 
home equity. 47 As previously explained in the Linda/Jim 
hypothetical scenario, equity is the difference between the amount of 
any outstanding debt that is secured by a piece of real property and 
the fair-market value of that property.48 Another illustration of 
equity might be helpful at this point. . 
Let us say that Joe bought a home fifteen years ago. He paid 
$200,000 for it, $20,000 of which constituted the down payment. To 
pay the remaining $180,000, he took out a loan secured by a deed of 
trust. 49 Five years ago, he decided to take out a second mortgage 
(which, for our purposes, is synonymous with the term "deed of 
trust") on his home in order to finance a venture he intended to 
launch. 50 How did Joe's bank decide how much money it could 
safely loan him? It determined the equity he had built up in his 
home. First, his bank looked at the amount of money Joe still owed 
on his initial loan of $180,000. He had paid off $115,000, so he had a 
remaining balance of $65,000. The bank's next step was to appraise 
the fair-market value of Joe's house. After ten years, the value of 
Joe's home had risen to $300,000. From there the bank subtracted 
the figure outstanding on Joe's original loan, $65,000, from the fair-
market value, $300,000. Therefore, Joe had $235,000 of equity in his 
home when he took out his second mortgage five years ago. Had Joe 
asked his bank for a loan of $100,000, his bank would almost 
certainly have agreed. 
46. The three sentences immediately preceding this note are, admittedly, present writer's 
own opinion. This comment is emphatically intended for intellectual consumption by 
legal practitioners on both sides of the proverbial left-right dividing line. 
47. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 7-8, 41-42. 
48. See supra Part I. 
49. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § I-IOI(d) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006) ('''Deed of 
trust' means only a deed of trust which secures a debt or the performance of an 
obligation, and does not include a voluntary grant unrelated to security purposes."). 
50. Mortgages and deeds of trust are loans secured by real property. The difference 
between them mainly concerns the procedural manner in which each is redeemed in 
the event of foreclosure. ALEXANDER GORDON, IV, GORDON ON MARYLAND 
FORECLOSURES § 3.2, at 28-29 (4th ed. 2004). 
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To further illustrate the significance of equity, let us look at what 
might have happened if Joe's venture had failed and he had become 
personally insolvent, thus triggering foreclosure on his home. 
Suppose that the foreclosure happened three years after Joe took out 
his second mortgage for $100,000. At this point, Joe had a remaining 
balance of $32,000 on the original loan with which he bought his 
house, and a balance of $70,000 on the second loan he needed to 
begin his ill-fated business. 
Meanwhile, in the three years since his bank appraised his home's 
fair-market value at $300,000, a booming local real estate market has 
inflated this figure to $340,000. Thus, we have a piece of real 
property valued at $340,000 about to be liquidated at a foreclosure 
sale in order to redeem the total balance of the two loans, which 
comes to $102,000. With $238,000 of equity in Joe's soon-to-be 
former house, his two lenders are in an excellent position. They are 
going to get their money back without a sweat, and the equity Joe had 
accumulated in his home is the primary reason. 51 
C. Predatory Lending-A Boon to the Scammers 
There are a number of reasons why a person may become 
temporarily or even permanently cash-poor despite having amassed 
significant home equity. Health crises, layoffs, and retirement are 
among the more common ones. 52 More broadly, the stagnation of 
middle- and lower-middle-class incomes over the past twenty years, 
often termed the "middle class squeeze,,,53 has helped to create fertile 
ground for EDEs.54 In many parts of the country, including 
Maryland, the curious confluence of stagnating incomes and rising 
real estate values has produced a spike in just the sort of equity-rich, 
yet cash-deficient households, that foreclosure scam artists target. 55 
However, no account of distressed homeownership in America 
today would be adequate without a description of the role subprime 
51. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 42. 
52. Id. at 7; see also Florence Wagman Roisman, National Ingratitude: The Egregious 
Deficiencies of the United States' Housing Programs for Veterans and the "Public 
Scandal" of Veterans' Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REv. 103, 141 (2005) 
("[U]nemployment, death, illness, and spousal abandonment are major reasons why 
homeowners lose their homes through default and foreclosure."). 
53. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 5; see also Elizabeth Warren, The Middle Class 
on the Precipice, HARV. MAG. Jan./Feb. 2006, at 28, available at 
http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/010682.htm (providing a broad discussion 
of the economic pressures on the middle class). 
54. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 3. 
55. Id. at 7-8. 
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lending plagrs in placing vulnerable households at risk of 
foreclosure. 5 A subprime loan (SPL) is one that carries a higher 
interest rate and often higher fees than a traditional prime loan. 57 
SPLs are typically extended to borrowers whose income and credit 
status would have rendered them ineligible for prime rate credit, 
although it should be noted that some subprime lenders tar~et people 
who mistakenly believe they are ineligible for prime loans. 
In 1993, SPLs accounted for 1 % of new loan originations. 59 By 
2004, this figure had risen to over 20%.60 It is estimated that 
between 10% and 20% of SPLs are used for home purchases. 61 The 
other 80% to 90% are typically backed by the borrower's existin~ 
home equity and are generally used for consumer credit purposes. 
The majority of SPLs are not used for home purchases because the 
increased risk of default they entail requires, from the lender's 
standpoint, that a borrower already have earned a significant amount 
of home equity as security for the loan. 63 A typical first-time 
homebuyer, especially one who is unable to obtain a prime loan, is 
unlikely to be in a position to make a large down payment on a new 
home and will not accrue much equity for at least a few years. 64 
From an EDE's perspective, SPLs are attractive because they carry 
a higher risk of eventual default than prime loans. 65 Whether or not a 
potential victim bought her house using an SPL, uncured delinquency 
equates to eventual foreclosure because most of these loans are 
secured by the borrower's home. 66 That risk of foreclosure is 
56. Id. at 7. 
57. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of 
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 723 (2006) ("Conversely, sub-prime 
loans generally rely more heavily on the equity in the home and up-front fees, in 
addition to higher interest rates, to cover higher origination, servicing, and default 
risk costs than do prime loans."). 
58. Id. at 726-27. According to Willis, a significant number of minority, lower-middle-
income borrowers believe they would not qualifY for prime market loans when in fact 
they possess excellent credit and need not resort to SPLs. Id. at 771, 773-74, 776. 
Willis notes that some subprime creditors are all too willing to cater to the 
misperceptions of these borrowers. Id. at 730. 
59. Id. at 722. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 723. 
62. Jd. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See id. 
66. !d. 
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heightened by the practices of many SPL lenders. 67 Dramatic 
advances in data processing and computer networking that took hold 
during the 1990s have made it possible for lenders to tailor loans on 
an individual basis. 68 
In theory, a greater variety of financing options should go hand in 
hand with increased comJ'etition for borrower business and thus 
expand consumer choice.6 The reality, however, is that many SPL 
lenders pack their loans with excessive up-front charges and interest 
rates disproportionate to the level of risk entailed. 7o A major reason 
why market competition among lenders does not prevent these types 
of practices is that the customization made possible by present-day 
processing technologr has yielded a dauntingly complex array of 
loans and loan terms. I Therefore, people who are in the market for 
SPLs do not typically have the option of price shopping for credit in a 
manner that is even remotely straightforward and comprehensible. 72 
Further, the nature of the SPL lending process undercuts the 
consumer's opportunity to price-shop. Because purveyors of SPLs 
can craft loans on a per-customer basis, the only way for potential 
borrowers to com-Nare terms would be to actually apply with several 
different lenders. Subprime borrowers are unlikely to do this for a 
number of reasons. 74 People with subpar credit, or whose 
experiences have led them to believe their credit is poor, often lack 
the funds necessary to pay application fees to a multiplicity of 
lenders. 75 In addition, consumers of SPLs are disproportionate~ 
undereducated in relation to those who borrow from prime lenders. 6 
Even if most could afford to submit applications to three or four or 
even five different lenders, the complexity of the terms contained in 
67. See generally id. at 724--28. Industry practices such as complicated price structuring, 
exaggerated original costs, and a lack of transparency impact loan selection and 
ability to repay. Id. 
68. Id. at 719, 724. Willis suggests that the dramatic increase in SPLs from 1993 to 2004 
occurred in significant part because of lenders' increased ability to fashion loans to 
match individual financial profiles. ld. at 719-20. This practice is commonly 
referred to as "price nichification." ld. at 724. 
69. See id. at 726. 
70. !d. at 725. Lenders may include junk fees such as underwriting or escrow analysis 
fees or inflate the costs of credit insurance. !d. 
71. !d. at 724--27. Price nichification makes advertising and price-shopping incredibly 
difficult. ld. 
72. Id. at 727-28. 
73. !d. 
74. ld. at 762. The specific issues are time and money. 
75. ld. at 763-64. See generally TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 7. 
76. Willis, supra note 57, at 763-64. 
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any offer would severely limit the odds of the applicants using these 
competing offers to arrive at a decision in line with their economic 
self-interest. 77 
Finally, the process of applying for home-based credit can be 
emotionally taxing for people who are at risk of being denied. 78 
Some writers have likened it to a "financial strip search.,,79 All of 
these factors work to the disadvantage of subprime borrowers by 
effectively curtailing competitive ~ressure on lenders to offer 
favorable, or at least fair, terms. 8 Abuses of the advantages 
bestowed upon lenders by these market imperfections have become 
commonplace to the point where "predatory lending" is a household 
term. 81 
Many SPLs contain high risk, unduly costly terms that might not be 
clear to the homeowners who agree to them until it is too late. 82 For 
example, it is not uncommon for SPLs to contain a sharp increase in 
the monthly amount due as a loan matures. 83 Sometimes called 
balloon payments, these hikes often leave homeowners with little 
choice but to refinance at terms that are still more unfavorable. 84 
Other SPLs, particularly those with adjustable interest rates, begin 
with relatively low monthly payments that rise over time to levels 
that mayor may not be within the borrower's reach.85 The common 
thread among the different varieties of predatory loans is that they put 
77. !d. at 727. For example, the total cost of a loan is often far from clear to many sub-
prime borrowers. Many of these borrowers decide whether to take on a home-equity 
loan based primarily upon the monthly amount due. !d. at 788. The required 
monthly payment, however, by itself, tells a prospective borrower very little about 
the total cost of the loan. !d. In order to calculate the latter, one would have to first 
figure out the principal, often inflated by up-front fees, then extrapolate several years 
into the future based on the percentage rate, with the added uncertainty presented by 
adjustable rates often a part of the mix. Id. at 724-25, 727. Acceleration clauses and 
prepayment penalties would further complicate any attempt to estimate the total cost 
of many subprime loans. Id. at 726. Present writer asserts that a mathematical 
morass that would be daunting to a typical Ph.D. candidate in the humanities is likely 
to prove beyond the grasp of many sub-prime consumers. 
78. Id. at 772. 
79. Id. at 775. 
80. Id. at 723-30. 
81. !d. at 736, 740. 
82. See generally id. at 766. (Most subprime borrowers "will take the first loan offer that 
comes in below their maximum monthly payment limit. ... [T]hey assess feasibility 
by looking at the near-term monthly payments only."). 
83. See generally id. at 724-25 (noting that subprime adjustable rate mortgages can 
increase each year). 
84. See id. at 738. 
85. See generally id. at 778. 
2007] Foreclosure Rescue Fraud 127 
homeowners at an increased risk of foreclosure. 86 As such, the recent 
proliferation of SPLs has been a boon for EDEs.87 
D. The Basic Types of FRF 
There are three primary ways in which distressed homeowners may 
be swindled out of all or part of the equity they have earned over the 
years.88 EDEs profit from (1) offering illusory assistance, sometimes 
called "phantom help,,;89 (2) acquiring title to homes in foreclosure 
by promisincr homeowners the opportunity eventually to reacquire 
ownership; 9 and (3) gaining title by fraudulent means such as 
leading their clients to believe they are signing loan documents or, 
even in some cases, for~ing homeowners' signatures. 91 
In the first type of scam, an EDE will approach a homeowner who 
has just received notice that her house has been scheduled for a 
foreclosure sale. 92 The EDE will offer to negotiate with her lender, 
as long as she pays a significant up-front fee, sometimes in the 
thousands of dollars. 93 While the scam artist might make a phone 
call or two on the homeowner's behalf, any actual work performed is 
at best a token effort. 94 A particularly ironic aspect of this form of 
FRF is that the victim often loses her home when earlier, cost-free 
intervention by a reRutable non-profit organization might have saved 
it from foreclosure. 5 
The second type of FRF is likely, in light of the PHFA's various 
disclosure requirements,96 to become the preferred choice of 
Maryland's most sophisticated EDEs, if it is not already.97 The 
hypothetical scenario described in the introduction is an example of 
86. Jd. at 736, 740. 
87. See, e.g., TRIPOLI & RENUART, si.pra note 4, at 7. 
88. See id. at 8. 
89. ld. 
90. ld. 
91. ld.at8-9. 
92. ld. at 9. 
93. See generally id. at 8. 
94. See id. at 8, 29 ("[P]eople [are charged] an exorbitant amount of money for a couple 
of futile phone calls to their mortgage company or referral to a bankruptcy attorney-
all phone calls the clients could have made themselves."). 
95. See generally id. at 8. 
96. See supra Part III. 
97. Morin Interview, supra note 13; see also Interview with Phillip Robinson, Executive 
Director, Civil Justice Network, in Baltimore, Maryland (Oct. 20, 2006) [hereinafter 
Robinson Interview]. Morin and Robinson are FRF attorneys in Maryland. Morin 
Interview, supra note 13. 
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this type of scam, sometimes referred to as a faulty "bailout.,,98 The 
EDE approaches a homeowner facing imminent foreclosure and 
offers to bring the mortgage current in exchange for title to the 
property. 99 The victim is led to believe that while remaining in the 
home as a renter, he will eventually be able to regain legal ownership 
of his house. 100 In fact, the terms by which any reconveyance to the 
homeowner may occur are normally so restrictive or onerous that the 
EDE almost always ends up retaining title to the pro~erty and, with it, 
the equity the homeowner spent years accumulating. 01 
An important way in which the "bailout" form of FRF has evolved 
in Maryland involves the use of third-party "investors." \02 An EDE 
will approach a homeowner in foreclosure and propose to assume 
title to the property in exchange for immediate help in bringing the 
delinquent loan current, with an option for the homeowner ultimately 
to reacquire title. \03 In these respects, it is similar to the scam 
described immediately above. However, instead of acquiring the 
prope~ in his own name, the EDE will enlist the assistance of a third 
party. I 4 The victim will then be directed to sign over a deed to this 
third party, whom the EDE will typically refer to as an "investor." \05 
The so-called investor does not actually invest anythinR.
106 In fact, 
he is sometimes paid as much as $15,000 by the EDE. 07 In return, 
the EDE skims off the equity without taking on any liability in his 
own name or that of his firm. 108 The quickest way to do this is to 
take out a new mortgage secured by the equity in the property at 
issue. 109 This new loan will actually be in the third party's name, 
although the implications of this might not always be clear to the 
third party. I \0 If the victim, for example, has accrued $90,000 in 
98. See supra Part I; see also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8. 
99. Morin Interview, supra note 13; see also Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
100. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8. 
101. /d. 
102. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
103. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
104. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
105. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
106. Morin Interview, supra note 13. Morin related to present writer an anecdote in which 
one of these third parties was asked during a court proceeding how much he had 
"invested" in the property at issue. To the judge's bemusement, the "investor," 
without any apparent sense of irony, gave a response along the lines of "I don't pay 
anything. They pay me. I'm an investor." /d. 
107. /d.; see also Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
108. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
109. Morin Interview, supra note 13. 
110. Id. 
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equity, the EDE might take out a new loan for $70,000 in the third 
party's name. 
On the one hand, because the EDE is not liable for this loan and 
has no legal obligation to repay it, he has already profited 
handsomely without having to concern himself with evicting the 
homeowner and reselling the property. I II On the other hand, if the 
EDE anticipates a significant rise in the property's value over the 
next year or so, he could use the proceeds from the new loan to keep 
both it and the victim's original loan current. When the property's 
market value has risen sufficiently to render it profitable for the EDE 
to do so, he could then evict the homeowner, sell the house to a BFP, 
and, if he wants to avoid litigation, payoff both the homeowner's 
mortgage and the third-party "investor's" loan. 112 Once again, the 
profitability of such a maneuver would depend upon how much the 
property had appreciated in value since the original contract between 
the EDE and the victim. However, putting the loan in the third 
party's name and not his own gives the EDE the option of either 
making off with the proceeds of this loan (the one in the third party's 
name) or executing the gambit just described. II3 
The third form of FRF differs from the second in that the 
homeowner does not realize he is transferring legal title to his 
property to the EDE.114 Given the level of stress a cash-poor 
Ill. [d. Of course, to say that the EOE has no legal obligation to repay the loan is merely 
to say that the loan is the third party's responsibility. This does not mean that what 
the EOE has done here is legal. Certainly, on the face of it, it appears that the EOE 
has committed a common law fraud against the third party. See Sass v. Andrew, 152 
Md. App. 406, 492, 832 A.2d 246, 260 (2003) (articulating five elements of common 
law fraud). Given both the third party's lack of clean hands in these sorts of 
situations and the likelihood that the EDE would not choose a third party who 
appeared astute to begin with, it seems reasonable that the risk of facing litigation 
initiated by the third party is a risk the more incorrigible EOEs would be willing to 
take. Morin Interview, supra note 13. 
112. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-401(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006); 
see also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 19, 26 (stating that the former 
homeowner is now acting as a tenant and the EOE is the landlord); see also Morin 
Interview, supra note 13. 
113. The scenario just described is in fact a product of present writer's own thinking. It 
does not mirror any particular account in the sources cited herein nor is it directly 
derived from any of the cases Morin or Robinson are currently litigating. The 
scenario, however, is useful in illustrating the inherent versatility of the FRF scam. 
As Parts III-V will demonstrate, in order to actually put an end to FRF, as opposed to 
simply adding to the ways in which it is illegal, one must endeavor to think like an 
EOE and thus anticipate possible variations of FRF before they have a chance to 
occur. 
114. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8-9. 
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homeowner facing foreclosure is likely experiencing, it is not 
surprising that EDEs have been able to trick their victims into signing 
over title to their homes. liS A familiar tactic is to lead the 
homeowner to believe that what she is signing is actually an 
agreement to refinance her original mortgage. I 16 Another method 
employed by EDEs is what might be called the "cut and paste" 
approach. 117 Here, the scammer has his victim sign documents that 
contain blank spaces and later inserts language purporting to convey 
title to the EDE.1l8 In fact, it appears that at least one of Maryland's 
EDEs has actually engaged in the forgery of a victim's signature. I 19 
While there is no way of knowing with exactitude the proportional 
significance of each type of FRF in Maryland, the opinion of two 
Maryland attorneys in the field is that the second and third kinds of 
FRF described represent the most serious threat to vulnerable 
homeowners. 120 The attorneys most active in litigating FRF have 
focused their energies on cases involving transfers of title. 121 This is 
not surprising, because the amounts of money involved are generally 
greatest when transfer of title is involved. 122 The analysis and 
suggested steps to follow, therefore, deal primarily with forms of 
FRF that include transfer of legal title to the victim's home. 
E. Maryland's Summary Foreclosure Process 
The EDE's job is made easier by Maryland foreclosure law. A 
mortgagee (lender) must provide notice to the mortgagor 
(homeowner) no sooner than thirty days and no later than ten days 
before the scheduled date of the foreclosure sale. 123 Although the 
statute requires that this notice be sent both by first-class mail and 
certified mail (return receipt requested), it does not require that any 
judicial notice be served upon the mortgagor pursuant to the 
foreclosure sale. 124 
liS. Morin Interview, supra note 13. 
116. Nathaniel C. Nichols, Home Alone: Home Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams and 
the Theft of Equity, II 1. AFFORDABLE Hous .. & CMTY. DEV. L. 280, 282 (2002). 
117. Morin Interview, supra note 13. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
121. Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
122. This is so because with "phantom help" a victim might lose a few thousand dollars 
but is not stripped of most or all of the equity she has earned in her home, as is the 
case when the EDE's take title to the properties involved. TRIPOLI & RENUART, 
supra note 4, at 8-9. 
123. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105(b)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2006). 
124. See id. § 7-105(b)(l)(ii); see GORDON, supra note 50, at 59. 
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The great majority of home loans in Maryland contain either an 
assent to a decree clause or a power of sale clause. 125 The two 
clauses differ mainly in the degree to which each frovides for judicial 
involvement in the foreclosure sale process. 12 Under an assent 
decree, the circuit court of the county in which the property at issue is 
located empowers the lender, or a trustee of the lender, to carry out a 
foreclosure sale upon adequate documentation of the loan's 
delinquency. 127 Power of sale foreclosures, on the other hand, are 
more directly managed by the court. 128 For a homeowner without the 
funds to redeem her mortgage before the date of sale, it is a 
distinction without a difference. Neither type of foreclosure sale 
requires service of process upon the homeowner. 129 
The procedural options for someone facing foreclosure are quite 
limited. In order to petition the court for an injunction to stop the 
sale, the petitioner must deposit with the court the full amount 
required to redeem the delinquent mortgage. 130 The grounds upon 
which an injunction may be granted are limited,131 but for 
homeowners in this situation the point is moot. 132 If this homeowner 
had the funds to deposit with the court, she would probably not be the 
customary target of EDEs. This is all the more true given that by the 
time a foreclosure sale has been scheduled, attorney's fees and other 
costs (such as auctioneer's fees) have typicall¥ been added to the 
amount required to bring the mortgage current. 13 
The only other procedural avenue available to Maryland 
homeowners who face foreclosure is to file objections to the sale 
after it has occurred or objections to the accounting process by which 
the past due amount was ca1culated. 134 Both options require highly 
technical arguments, and neither provides a distressed homeowner 
125. GORDoN,supra note 50, at 17-18. 
126. !d. at 20. 
127. Id. at 18,244. 
128. !d. at 301. 
129. !d. at 59. 
130. See PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 20-21. 
131. See GORDON, supra note 50, at 23-24. 
132. See id. at 22. 
133. PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP,supra note 3, at 120. 
134. GORDON, supra note 50, at 23-24. In a sharply worded opinion that bordered on the 
dismissive, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in Billingsley v. Lawson, 43 
Md. App. 713, 725, 406 A.2d 946, 954 (1979), upheld the constitutionality of 
Maryland's foreclosure laws against a challenge on both federal and state due process 
grounds. 
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with the thing she really needs-additional time. 135 The state 
legislature has addressed this in a small way by requiring a person 
authorized to make a foreclosure sale to notify the mortgagor within 
two days of filing with the court. 136 In practice, this means that a 
homeowner facing foreclosure will receive notice fifteen to twenty 
days before the date of sale, rather than ten days. 137 It does not seem 
likely that this extra time will hinder the EDEs; however, because 
fifteen to twenty days is still a sufficient period to exploit a 
homeowner's emotional distress. 
However, the PHF A does make life harder, or at least more 
complicated, for the EDEs in a number of ways. The following 
analysis of the PHF A illustrates this point. 
Ill. THE MARYLAND PROTECTION OF HOMEOWNERS IN 
FORECLOSURE ACT 
On May 26, 2005, former Maryland Governor Robert Ehrlich, Jr. 
signed the Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act: 138 an 
"emergency" statute aimed squarely at the perpetrators of FRF.139 
Partially based on a similar statute in Minnesota,140 the PHF A is, on 
balance, a good law in several respects. 141 It provides a direct way 
for liti.,gators to prove the illegality of the more sophisticated forms of 
FRF.I While the Maryland Consumer Protection Act l43 (CPA) and 
common-law doctrines including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
unconscionability provide grounds for arguing the illegality of FRF 
practices, the PHF A makes it much easier to contend with this in a 
manner that will prevail in court. 144 
13S. PROTECTING HOMEOWNERSHIP, supra note 3, at 20. 
136. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-IOS(a-I)(l) to (a-I)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2003 & 
Supp. 2006). 
137. GORDON, supra note SO, at 23. 
138. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to -321 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (subtitled 
"Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure."); see also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra 
note 4, at 24. 
139. REAL PROP. §§ 7-301 to -321. 
140. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 32SN.OI(b)(9) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). While Maryland 
adoptcd the same basic premise as Minnesota, a few differences are notable. The 
statutes clearly differ on whom they regulate, and exempt, and the amount of 
damages that can be recovered. See also TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 24. 
141. Interview with Alexander Gordon, IV, Author, in Baltimore, Maryland (Nov. 29, 
2006) [hereinafter Gordon Interview]. 
142. See generally TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 64 (including provisions that 
cover all three types of foreclosure specialists: foreclosure consultants, foreclosure or 
equity property purchasers, and foreclosure or equity surplus purchasers). 
143. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-101 to -501 (LexisNexis 2005). 
144. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 45-46. 
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The PHF A defines "foreclosure consultant" in broad terms. Under 
the statute's language, anyone who in any way represents to a person 
that he can delay or prevent foreclosure of that person's home 
qualifies as a foreclosure consultant and thereby is covered under the 
PHF A. 145 The relevant language is in the singular tense ("contacts a 
homeowner"); thus it appears that an EDE need only have had 
contact with a single victim in order to fall under the PHFA's 
authority.146 Assistance in securing a loan or other source of funds is 
listed among the activities that designate a party as a foreclosure 
consultant under PHF A, as is any assistance in preventing or limitin,R 
damage to the credit rating of a homeowner facing foreclosure. I 
The PHF A also covers oral, written, in-person, and electronic means 
of representation as well as contacts made through 
telecommunications. 148 The PHF A is comprehensive in defining a 
foreclosure consultant. There seems to be no way that an EDE could 
propose to render any form of assistance of interest to a homeowner 
facing foreclosure that would not subject that EDE to the PHFA's 
h . 149 aut onty. 
The PHF A however, does exempt several classes of 
professionals. 150 The statute does not apply to attorneys or anyone 
whose "normal business activities" fall under the authority of either 
Maryland or United States law "regulating banks, trust companies, 
savings and loan associations, credit unions, or insurance 
companies." 151 Similarly, the PHF A does not apply to title insurers 
and title insurance producers authorized or licensed to conduct 
business in Maryland, and mortgage brokers and lenders whose 
authorit~ derives from Title 11, Subtitle 5 of the Financial Institutions 
Article. 52 The statute also exempts real estate brokers, associate real 
estate brokers, and real estate salespeople licensed under Title 17 of 
the Business Occupations and Professions Article. 153 Additionally, 
the PHF A excludes any non-profit organization that deals exclusively 
with homeowners in loan default or facing foreclosure, so long as the 
organization does not have any direct, indirect, or privity relationship 
145. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-301(b)(l)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
146. See id. § 7-301(b)(l). 
147. See id. §§ 7-301(b)(l)(vi)-(vii). 
148. See id. § 7-301(b)(l). 
149. See generally id. § 7-301(b). 
ISO. See id. § 7-302(a). 
lSI. !d. §§ 7-302(a)(1), (a)(3)(i). 
152. !d. §§ 7-302(a)(5)-(a)(7). 
153. !d. § 7-302(a)(8). 
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with for-profit lenders or foreclosure purchasers. 154 Finally, the 
PHF A exempts any creditors of the homeowner, so long as the 
homeowner's obligation to the creditor did not arise from a 
foreclosure reconveyance. 155 
Language in the PHF A provides, however, that even parties who 
fall into an exempted class lose this exemption if they engage in 
activities "intended to transfer title to a residence in foreclosure 
directly or indirectly to that individual, or an agent or affiliate of that 
individual.,,156 The statute does not define affiliate for the purposes 
of determining whether an otherwise exempted party shall be subject 
to its coverage. In Part V, this Comment will argue that the lack of a 
clear and inclusive definition of affiliate opens a potential loophole 
that should be closed. 157 
The PHF A also defines "foreclosure consulting contract" and 
"foreclosure consulting service.,,158 It defines the former as an oral, 
written, or equitable agreement by which a foreclosure consultant 
agrees to grovide any foreclosure consulting service to a 
homeowner. 59 The scope of the former defmition, therefore, 
depends upon the substance of the latter. In broad, exhaustive terms, 
the PHF A states that the term "foreclosure consulting service" 
includes any efforts to contact or negotiate with creditors on the 
homeowner's behalf as well as any efforts to prevent or delay 
foreclosure. 160 
The PHF A's definition of "foreclosure consulting service" also 
encompasses any efforts to effect an arrangement by which a 
homeowner will transfer title to another party as an alternative to 
foreclosure; remain in the home as a renter, tenant, or lessee; or 
convey title with an option to reacquire ownership of the home. 161 
Given the PHFA's language, only a willfully restrictive reading of 
the statute would fail to include any plausible form of FRF from its 
coverage. The addition, however, of language expressly providing 
that the PHF A should be construed liberally for coverage and 
enforcement purposes would be a welcome addition. 
154. /d. § 7-302(a)(9). 
ISS. See id. §§ 7-302(a)(4), 7-105(b). 
156. Id. § 7-302(b). 
157. See infra Part V.A. 
158. REAL PROP. §§ 7-301(c)--(d). 
159. Id. § 7-301(c). 
160. See generally id. § 7-301(d). 
161. See id. §§ 7-301(d)(7)--(d)(I0). 
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The PHF A gives homeowners the right to "[ r ]escind a foreclosure 
consulting contract at any time." 162 In addition, it provides that a 
homeowner may "[r]escind a foreclosure reconveyance at any time 
before midnight of the [third] business day after any conveyance or 
transfer in an~ manner of legal or equitable title to a residence in 
foreclosure." 1 3 The statute defines rescission in appropriately 
inclusive terms, stating that it may occur by writing, facsimile, or 
electronic mail, provided it is sent to an address identified either in 
the contract or in any other materials that the foreclosure consultant 
provided to the homeowner. 164 A rescission is effective, regardless 
of whether its form mirrors that of the contract, as long as it makes 
clear the homeowner's intent to rescind either the contract or the 
reconveyance. 165 Finally, the PHF A expressly states that "[t]he riftht 
to rescind may not be conditioned on the repayment of any funds." 66 
While the PHF A's rescission provisions appear to be properly 
tailored to the protection of vulnerable homeowners, the provisions 
might not go far enough. Extending the three-day period for 
rescission of foreclosure reconveyances to ten days, for instance, 
would provide potential FRF victims with added time to digest the 
terms of any agreement which they have signed. It is worth restating 
here that time constraints,167 limitations set by the courts,168 and 
psychological pressures from EDEs 169 all lessen the likelihood of a 
homeowner actually understanding and reflecting upon the terms of 
an agreement to convey title in her home to another party. While the 
three-day rescission window affords some protection, it would be 
better for the legislature to err on the side of caution and provide 
more time. If a ten-day period is too long for some Maryland 
lawmakers, perhaps they could craft a compromise in the five-to-
seven day range. 
The PHF A also attempts to render the terms of foreclosure 
consulting contracts and reconveyances a bit more clear to potential 
162. ld. § 7-305(a)(I). 
163. [d. § 7-305(a)(2). The Maryland Protection of Homeowners in Foreclosure Act 
("PHF A") defines "foreclosure reconveyance" as a transaction in which a 
homeowner facing foreclosure transfers title of the property to another party with the 
understanding that the homeowner will reacquire title to the home following the 
completion of the foreclosure proceeding. See id. §§ 7-301(1)(1)-(2). 
164. See id. § 7-305(b). 
165. [d. § 7-305(d). 
166. !d. § 7-305(1). 
167. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra notes 125-37 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. 
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victIms. It requires that any contract be printed in at least 12 point 
type and written in the language typically spoken by the 
homeowner. 170 Perhaps more significantly, the PHFA mandates that 
foreclosure consulting contracts specify the exact nature of the 
services to be provided, including any reconveyances. 171 Finally, the 
contract must "[fJully disclose ... the total amount and tenns of any 
compensation" that the foreclosure consultant., "or anyone working in 
association with the consultant" will receive. 1 2 
The PHF A does not attempt to define the terms exact nature or in 
association. 173 It is, therefore, not clear if the latter term is 
synonymous with the above-discussed term affiliate. 174 Regardless, 
nature and association tend to be concepts of degree rather than 
precision,175 and may lend themselves more readily to judicial 
interpretation than to any attempt at statutory definition. 176 As noted 
above, present writer recommended that the Maryland legislature add 
language to the PHF A expressly prescribing that its provisions be 
liberally interpreted. 177 This recommendation bears repeating here. 
The legislature might also consider including a statement such as: 
"Any potentially ambiguous terms in the PHF A, such as 'exact 
nature,' 'affiliate,' or 'in association,' are to be construed in a manner 
consistent with the PHF A's overarching goal of protecting vulnerable 
homeowners facing foreclosure." 
In keeping with the aforesaid attempt to hold foreclosure 
consultants to a certain standard of contractual clarity, the PHF A 
requires that all foreclosure consulting contracts include, in at least 
15-point type, notice of the homeowner's right to rescind. 178 The 
statute also states that all foreclosure consulting contracts must 
include, in at least 14-point boldface type, notice of the homeowner's 
right to rescind a foreclosure reconveyance as well as an admonition 
170. REAL PROP. § 7-306(a)(2). 
171. Id. § 7-306(a)(3). 
172. Id. 
173. See id. §§ 7-301, 7-306. 
174. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. 
175. Cj John Harllee. The Protection of the Unpublished Application Protocol Interface 
Under Copyright Law, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ~ 34 (1999), http://www.vjolt.netJ 
voI4/issue/v4i2a6-harllee.html (stating that "the meaning of 'nature' is statutorily 
quite ambiguous"); Jenny Dionne Dennis, The California Legislature Decided That 
Unincorporated Businesses are People Too, 38 MCGEORGE L. REv. 247, 253 (2007) 
(characterizing "association" as an ambiguous term open to judicial interpretation). 
176. See, e.g., Harllee. supra note 175, at ~ 34; see also Dennis. supra note 175, at 253. 
177. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
178. REAL PROP. § 7-306(c)(2)(iii). 
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that the homeowner should "contact an attorney before signing." 179 
While these provisions are necessary, it is still easy enough to 
imagine an EDE burying a homeowner beneath an intimidating hill of 
paperwork that many victims would likely regard as 
incomprehensib Ie. 
The PHF A dictates the terms of foreclosure reconveyances in 
several ways. It requires that the homeowner receive at least 82% of 
the net proceeds from any resale of the property that occurs within 
eighteen months of the date the homeowner entered into the 
reconveyance. 180 The statute also mandates that a foreclosure 
purchaser (the party obtaining title from the original homeowner) 
ascertain that the homeowner have the reasonable ability to reacquire 
title to the property.181 Further, the PHFA defines reasonable ability 
in this context by stating that if the homeowner's "primary housing 
expenses," plus any other payments resulting from personal debt, do 
not exceed 60% of her monthly gross income, there is a rebuttable 
presumption of reasonable ability to pay. 182 
These provisions are useful primarily because they present a black-
letter line that would-be EDEs may not cross if they are to avoid 
liability. In addition, the PHF A prohibits any foreclosure consultant 
from acquiring, either "directly or indirectly, or by means of a 
subsidiary, affiliate, or corporation" an interest in the property of a 
homeowner with whom the consultant has entered into a foreclosure 
consulting contract. 183 Thus, the PHF A draws a line between 
foreclosure consultants and foreclosure purchasers. Consistent with 
this, the statute prohibits foreclosure purchasers from representing to 
homeowners in any way that they are helping to save the house or 
otherwise acting in an advisory capacity. 184 
While the PHF A makes it nearly impossible for an EDE to legally 
strip equity from homeowners facing foreclosure, this is not the 
statute's primary significance. Under common-law doctrines such as 
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionabili~, some EDEs' 
practices were illegal before the PHF A's enactment. I 5 Keeping that 
179. Jd. §§ 7-306(a)(5), 7-306(c)(2), 7-3 IO(c). 
180. ld. § 7-31l(b)(2)(ii). 
181. Jd. § 7-311(b)(l)(i). 
182. ld. § 7-31 I (c)(l). 
183. ld. § 7-307(5). 
184. ld. §§ 7-31 I (b)(4)(i), (b)(4)(iii). 
185. Professor Lauren E. Willis eschews traditional approaches to defining "foreclosure 
rescue scams" as either complete fraud or by referencing unwieldy "lists of specific 
predatory practices." Willis, supra note 57, at 735-36, 738-40. Instead, she 
propounds a new definition of "predatory lending" as "noncompetitively overpriced 
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in mind, the PHF A therefore makes it much easier to prove that 
FRF-injust about any conceivable form-is, in fact, illegal. 186 
Perhaps more importantly, the PHFA effectively increases the 
availability of legal representation to victims of FRF. 187 The impact 
is rooted in the language of section 7-320(c), which provides that, in 
civil actions against parties subject to the PHFA's authority, the court 
may award "damages equal to three times the amount of actual 
damages" if it finds that "the defendant willfully or knowingly" 
violated the statute. 188 The PHF A also includes misdemeanor 
criminal penalties for guilty EDEs; 189 however, in Part V, this 
Comment will address the need for harsher penalties in order to 
further deter EDEs from engaging in predatory lending practices. 190 
Finally, the PHF A contains a provision stating that a "bona fide 
purchaser ... or lender for value who enters into a transaction with a 
homeowner or a foreclosure purchaser when a foreclosure consulting 
contract is in effect or during the period when a foreclosure 
reconveyance may be rescinded... receives good title to the 
property." 191 This good title is free and clear of any interest that any 
party to the reconveyance or foreclosure consulting contract, 
including the homeowner, may have had. 192 This language opens a 
and overly risky home loans." Id. at 735-36, 740. While Maryland's General 
Assembly has attempted to curb certain practices that are subsumed under Willis' 
concept of "predatory lending" by enacting the PHF A, other jurisdictions have 
strived to extend homeowners similar protections by employing common law 
doctrines of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unconscionability. See, e.g., Barker 
v. Altegra Credit Co., 251 B.R. 250, 257-60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that a 
mortgage broker committed fraud and breached her fiduciary duty to use her best 
efforts to find a loan in the best interests of the borrower). 
186. The language of the PHFA provides bright-line, substantive protections for 
homeowners. For example, under the PHFA, a contract must be given to the 
homeowner that specifies the terms of the foreclosure consulting agreement, must 
give notice of rescission rights and must include warnings that the homeowner should 
confer with an attorney before signing. REAL PROP. § 7-306. 
187. See id. § 7-320. 
188. Id. § 7-320(c). The possibility of being awarded damages beyond those actually 
sustained, in the form of punitive damages, encouragcs citizcns to serve as 
prosecutors and thereby act as "private attorneys general." David Owcn, Punitive 
Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257, 1287-88 (1976). 
The same concept can be applied to claims for treble damages as such claims permit 
the litigation of claims that might otherwise be too expensive for an individual 
plaintiff to initiate. Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of 
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1,69 (1986). 
189. REAL PROP. § 7-321. 
190. See infra notes 273-85 and accompanying text. 
191. REAL PROP. § 7-311(e). 
192. Id. 
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potentially exploitable loophole in the PHF A. While the provision 
does not enable EDEs to strip equity without breaking the law, it 
nevertheless comes dangerously close to enabling lenders to do 
business with EDEs and their affiliates and claim BFP <Rrotection, 
since these lenders typically are not parties to FRF scams. 1 
If such a lender were afforded BFP protection, then even a 
homeowner who successfully obtains judgment against an EDE could 
lose her home, since the lender would retain title to it. 194 The 
PHFA's BFP loophole has enabled the more clever EDEs to profit by 
taking out new mortgage loans secured by properties to which they 
have fraudulently acquired title. 195 As long as lenders have a good 
chance of benefiting from BFP protections, even respectable, 
mainstream lenders have little economic incentive to closely examine 
just how a borrower has gained title to the secured property. 196 
The question of whether Maryland's courts will judge institutions 
that lend, unwittingly or otherwise, to EDEs and their affiliates to be 
BFPs therefore looms large for attorneys who represent FRF victims. 
The following section addresses this issue. 
IV. LITIGATING FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S SIDE 
A. BFP Law and Inquiry Notice 
Presumably, one of the goals of an attorney representing the victim 
of an FRF scheme will be to enable the client to keep his or her 
home. As previously noted, language in the PHFA purporting to 
protect "bona fide purchaser!s]. ... or... lender[s] for value" 
presents a potential obstacle. 1 7 If Maryland's courts ultimately 
decide that a party who has made a mortgage loan to an EDE's third 
party, based on the equity in that home, is a BFP lender, title to the 
193. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL & STATE 
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, GAO-04-280, at 
6, 72-73, 76 (2004) [hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION] (While the secondary 
market for mortgage loans may benefit borrowers by increasing access to credit, it 
may also facilitate predatory lending by both "providing a source of funds for 
unscrupulous originators to quickly sell off loans with predatory terms" and 
"reducing incentives for these originators to ensure that borrowers can repay their 
loans."). 
194. REAL PROP. § 7-311(e). See infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the liability of a lender claiming BFP protection. 
195. CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 193, at 72, 76. 
196. /d. at 76-77. 
197. REAL PROP. § 7-311(e). 
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home ultimately passes to the lender. 198 In such a case, the mortgage 
owed to this lender by either the EDE or the EDE's third party agent 
(in whose name the loan would likely be) would have to be paid off 
before the victimized homeowner could recover good title to the 
home. 199 
While, in theory, a court may hold an EDE liable for any money 
owed to a BFP lender, it seems unlikely that a plaintiffs attorney, not 
to mention his or her client, would want the restoration of title in the 
home to depend upon the solvency of a scam artist. Similarly, if a 
party who entered into a contract to buy the property from the EDE, 
or a third party agent thereof, were judged by the courts to be a BFP 
purchaser, the victim might come away from litigation with plenty of 
cash but no title to her home. 2oo Clearly, under the PHFA's existing 
language, it will be in a plaintiffs interest to argue that any non-EDE 
affiliated party claiming title to or a security interest in her home is 
not a BFP. 
A purchaser of real property is considered a BFP if he enters into 
the conveyance without notice of any existinJ.1 claims to the property 
to which such claims could cloud his title. 2 A purchaser may be 
charged with actual or constructive notice of extant or competing 
claims to his title. 202 In the case of the former, the vendee has been 
expressly informed of any potentially problematic claims, 
encumbrances, or interests. 203 Constructive notice generally takes 
two different forms. Buyers of real property are responsible for 
knowledge of any interests that have been properly recorded in the 
applicable jurisdiction's land records. 204 This legal mandate is known 
as record notice. 205 
In addition, the law presumes that a vendee of real property has 
made a proper examination of any circumstances that would alert a 
person of average vigilance to the possibility of existing umesolved 
claims to the property.206 Along with this, the purchaser is also 
198. Id. 
199. See supra notes 40-137 and accompanying text for an account of how EDEs use 
third parties to secure mortgage financing for their own gain. 
200. See REAL PROP. § 7-311(e). For a description of the PHFA's trcble damages 
provision see supra notes 187-88, and accompanying text. 
201. Frederick Ward Assocs. v. Venture, Inc., 99 Md. App. 251, 256, 636 A.2d 496, 498 
(1994). 
202. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. v. Schlossberg, 390 Md. 211, 247, 888 A.2d 297, 
319 (2005). 
203. Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md. 340, 343--44,196 A.2d 893, 895-96 (1964). 
204. Greenpoint Mortgage, 390 Md. at 229, 231, 888 A.2d at 308, 310. 
205. !d. at 230, 888 A.2d at 308. 
206. Blondell v. Turover, 195 Md. 251,257,72 A.2d 697,699 (1950). 
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charged with knowledge of any facts that such an investigation would 
have revealed. 207 
This second form of constructive notice is referred to as inquiry 
notice. 208 It is this form of notice that is likely to be of primary 
interest to an attorney representing the victim of an FRF scheme, as 
an EDE is certainly not going to inform a lender or buyer that his title 
to the property at issue was fraudulently obtained.209 Thus, a lender 
or purchaser seeking BFP protection is not liable to be charged with 
actual notice of the victim's claim to the property.210 On the other 
hand, a title search of the home will reveal both the original mortgage 
loan and the foreclosure filing that wompted the victim to enter into a 
privity relationship with the EDE.2 1 
A party who actually seeks to buy the victim's home from the EDE 
or an agent thereof will have record notice that the property was 
recently in foreclosure and that the property remains subject to the 
original mortgage (the one in the victim homeowner's name).212 If 
the prospective buyer nonetheless goes ahead with the transaction 
and "buys" the property from the EDE, it seems likely that the buyer 
would thus be charged with record notice of, at least, the existing 
mortgage. 213 While an EDE might be able to fool certain people into 
thinking that this existing mortgage is somehow no longer a problem, 
this is not the sort of transaction that presents the biggest threat to the 
distressed homeowner's hope of quieting title via litigation. 214 
Rather, as we saw earlier, EDEs are using the existing equity on the 
homes to which they have fraudulently obtained title as a means of 
obtaining additional mortgage funding-which they then pocket-
knowing that someone else's name (typically the third party's) is on 
the paperwork.215 Although the parties making these loans will be 
charged with the same record notice attributed to a would-be 
purchaser of the property, in the case of a lender this would be beside 
the point. 
A prudent financial institution will likely only loan a purported 
title-holder, be it an EDE or anyone else, an amount of money that is 
207. [d. 
208. [d. 
209. [d. 
210. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text. 
21l. 
212. 
213. 
J. PAUL RIEGER, JR., EXAMINING TITLES TO REAL ESTATE IN MARYLAND 5 (1997). 
See GORDON, supra note 50, at 330-31. 
Kramer v. Emche, 64 Md. App. 27,43-44,494 A.2d 225, 234 (1985). 
214. See Morin Interview, supra note 13; see also Robinson Interview, supra note 97. 
215. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text. 
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reasonably secured by the property backing the loan. 216 The lender 
will ascertain the existing liability on the original mortgage in the 
distressed homeowner's name before extending any credit to the 
EDE.217 When the EDE takes the money and runs off to Tahiti, the 
institution that has lent the EDE this money will presumably 
foreclose on the property.218 The value of the home will, if the 
second lender correctly ascertained the existing equity upon 
extending credit, cover the amounts owed to both the original creditor 
(who loaned money to the victim homeowner) and the second lender 
(who disbursed funds to the EDE or an agent).219 The presence of 
the original mortgage, therefore, would lack the decisive significance 
for the second lender that it would have for an actual purchaser. 220 
The second lender (lending to the EDE's third party agent) would not 
ultimately be harmed, at least in theory, even if the holder of the first 
mortgage was given priority; the eventual sale of the property would 
make both parties whole. 221 
B. Maryland BFP Precedent 
A quick recap of the significance of the PHFA's BFP provision 
might be helpful at this point. Because the more sophisticated EDEs 
are choosing to profit from their victims' equity by taking out 
mortgage loans based upon this equity, the institutions making these 
loans may well be judged by the courts to be BFP lenders. 222 If they 
in fact are so judged, their claim to the victim's property could 
prevent successful plaintiffs from regaining clear title to their 
homes. 223 Plaintiffs' attorneys, therefore, will want to argue that 
these lenders are not BFPs. The most plausible theory upon which 
such an argument can be built is that the circumstances incident to the 
extension of credit by the lender at issue to the EDE (or her agent) 
should have put the lender on in~uiry notice as to a possible defect in 
the EDE's title to the property.22 
216. See generally Willis, supra note 57, at 723. 
217. Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Drafting: Lessons from the Restatement 0/ Mortgages, 
33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 415,447 (1998). 
218. GORDON, supra note 50, at 48. 
219. See David B. Simpson, Real Property Foreclosures: The Fallacy o/Durrett, 19 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 73,79-80 (1984). 
220. See id. 
221. See id. 
222. See supra notes 191-96 and accompanying text. 
223. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-311(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
224. See, e.g., Blondell v. Turover, 195 Md. 251, 72 A.2d 697 (1950). 
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In the 1950 case Blondell v. Turover,225 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland established the standard for inquiry notice that remains the 
rule today. The court stated: 
In determining whether a purchaser had notice of any prior 
equities or unrecorded interests, so as to preclude him from 
being entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser, the rule 
is that if he had knowledge of circumstances which ought to 
have put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry, he will 
be presumed to have made such inquiry and will be charged 
with notice of all facts which such an investigation would in 
all probability have disclosed if it had been properly 
pursued. 226 
Blondell involved a situation in which a real estate broker sought to 
purchase a tract ofland before another party's option to buy the same 
land had expired. 227 The broker, in effect, willfully ignored 
indications of the option holder's existing rights to the prope!1Y and 
entered into a contract with the vendor to acquire the land. 228 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, applying the inquiry notice rule cited 
above, held that the real estate broker was not a BFP.229 The court 
reasoned that had the broker, in response to indications that another 
party retained an option to purchase the property in question, 
undertaken a reasonably diligent inquiry to determine whether this 
was in fact the case, the broker would have learned that it indeed was 
true. 230 The broker was thus char~ed with this knowledge and hence 
not entitled to protection as a BFP. 31 
Blondell has been followed by Maryland courts several times since 
its issuance, most notably, for our purposes, in the 1985 case Kramer 
v. Emche. 232 In Kramer, a lender, in the course of examining title to 
a residential property to which it had gained two deeds of trust as 
security for a pair of loans, discovered that the deed to the property 
was not in the borrower's name. 233 The lender then confronted the 
borrower with this information. 234 The borrower explained to the 
225. Id. 
226. !d. at 257, 72 A.2d at 699. 
227. !d. at 254-56, 72 A.2d at 698-99. 
228. Id. at 256, 72 A.2d at 699. 
229. !d. at 257-58, 72 A.2d at 699-700. 
230. !d. at 258, 72 A.2d at 700. 
231. !d. 
232. 64 Md. App. 27,494 A.2d 225 (1985). 
233. Id. at 33, 494 A.2d at 229. 
234. !d. at 33-34, 494 A.2d at 229. 
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lender that upon acquiring the property, he (the borrower) had lacked 
the funds to pay the applicable taxes, which, in tum, prevented him 
from being able to secure a deed in his name. 235 AcceRting this 
explanation, the lender thereupon paid the aforesaid taxes. 36 After 
doing this, the lender went forward with the two loans to the 
borrower, who in tum recorded a deed to the property in his name. 237 
The excuse given to the lender by the borrower for initially lacking 
record title in his name was, as it turns out, the truth. 238 It was not, 
however, the whole truth. 239 Unbeknownst to the lending party, the 
borrower still owed the bulk of the purchase price for the home to the 
initial vendor. 240 In addition, this debt was, as one would expect, 
secured by a deed of truSt. 241 Why did the lender here go forward 
with the transaction knowing that, in fact, there was virtually no 
equity in the home to protect its interests in the event of default? It 
did so because it did not, in fact, know this. The lender failed to 
perform a title search of the securing pro~erty which would have 
revealed any outstanding mortgages or liens. 42 
Owing to an attorney's negligence, the mortgage backing the 
outstandin~ debt for the purchase price of the home had never been 
recorded. 2 The lending party, therefore, had not been placed on 
record notice that any such debt existed. 244 When the borrower 
ultimately defaulted on all three loans (the one owed to the vendor 
and the two owed to the subsequent lender), foreclosure proceedings 
followed. 245 At issue in the resulting litigation, of course, was which 
creditor's mortgage would take priority.246 The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland ruled that, the aforementioned gap in the land 
records notwithstanding, the overall circumstances of the transaction 
between the lending and borrowing parties here had ~ut the lender on 
inquiry notice of the already existing mortgage. 24 As such, the 
lender was not entitled to BFP protection, and its claim to the home 
235. !d. at 34, 494 A.2d at 229. 
236. !d. 
237. !d. 
238. fd. at 31-44, 494 A.2d at 228-34. 
239. fd. at 34, 494 A.2d at 229. 
240. /d. at 42, 494 A.2d at 231. 
241. fd. at 32, 494 A.2d at 228. 
242. fd. at 33-34, 494 A.2d at 229. 
243. /d. at 32, 494 A.2d at 228. 
244. !d. 
245. !d. at 35, 494 A.2d at 230. 
246. fd. at 36, 494 A.2d at 230. 
247. fd. at 44, 494 A.2d at 234. 
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was subordinated to that of holder of the original mortgage (the one 
backing the purchase price of the home). 248 
In some respects, the Kramer precedent bodes well for attorneys 
who are, or will soon be, arguing that an institution lending to an 
EDE should, by virtue of the "totality of the circumstances" 
surrounding the transaction, be charged with inquiry notice of the 
fraud underlying the ~rocess by which the EDE has obtained title to 
the securing property. 49 In Kramer, the court in effect reasoned that 
a borrower who had not been able to pay the taxes on property he had 
purchased should not simply be assumed to have already paid for this 
property in full. 25o The simple lack of a recorded mortgage, 
therefore, should not have put the lender at ease. Rather, the odd and 
unlikely juxtaposition of unpaid taxes and the complete lack of any 
recorded lien should, as the line of reasoning concludes, have aroused 
the lender's suspicions and led to further inquiry. In tum, such 
further in~uiry would have revealed the existence of the unrecorded 
mortgage. 51 
Kramer is on point for our purposes in that it deals with lenders, 
rather than purchasers, seeking and being denied BFP protection. At 
the same time, however, there is plenty to distinguish the facts of 
Kramer from those of a case involving possible BFP status for an 
EDE's creditor. Any halfway-competent EDE will have ensured that 
title to the victim's home is in his agent third partY's name before 
seeking out financing based on the home's equity.252 An attorney for 
a lender seeking clear title to the victim's property on the grounds of 
BFP status would certainly stress this in seeking to distinguish 
Kramer. On the other hand, a plaintiff s attorney seeking to save the 
victim's claim to her home, might point out that the inevitable 
presence of a recent foreclosure filing in an FRF scenario presents a 
compelling reason why any subsequent lender should be charged 
with inquiry notice. 253 
C. First Impression 
While Kramer merits the treatment it has received here because it 
appears to be the only Maryland inquiry notice case involving a 
lender for value, the truth is that the question of whether a party who 
248. [d. at 43, 494 A.2d at 234. 
249. Id. at 44, 494 A.2d at 234. 
250. See id. at 34, 43, 494 A.2d at 229, 234. 
251. [d. at 44, 494 A.2d at 234. 
252. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 4, at 8, 33. 
253. GORDON, supra note 50, at 330-31. 
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lends to an EDE' s third party agent merits BFP status will be one of 
first impression in Maryland. 254 The confluence of evolving methods 
of FRF, the newness of the PHF A, the potential loophole created by 
the PHF A's BFP language, and the likelihood of increased FRF 
litigation born of the opportunity for treble damages has placed the 
BFP doctrine on a collision course with an almost inevitable 
challenge to its scope. 255 
A lack of precedent does not, by itself, leave us without clues as to 
how the issue will play out when it eventually reaches Maryland's 
appellate courts. Certain basic factors are likely to shape the 
arguments presented by both sides. Any party that has lent to an 
EDE and subsequently seeks BFP protection will have had record 
notice of both the existence of an outstanding mortgage in another 
person's name and a recent foreclosure filing on the property in 
question. 256 An attorney seeking to quiet title in an FRF victim's 
name could argue that these facts should have aroused the suspicions 
of any reasonably prudent lender. From this, a plaintiffs advocate 
could reason that a properly diligent investigation conducted by the 
lender to discover the reasons for both the outstanding mortgage and 
the recent foreclosure filing would have revealed that the EDE 
acquired title through fraudulent means. 257 In effect, a lawyer on this 
side of the issue would contend that the lender ought not be rewarded 
with BFP protection for turning a blind eye to a facially dubious set 
of circumstances. 
While this reasoning might prevail when all is said and done on this 
issue, we cannot be certain of it. Confession and avoidance may well 
be a viable strategls for a lender facing an inquiry-notice-based 
challenge to its title. 58 A bona fide lender for value can argue that so 
long as it has ascertained that the party to whom it has lent money 
254. See Baltrotsky v. Kugler, 395 Md. 468, 474-75,910 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (2006); see 
also Pizza v. Walter, 345 Md. 664, 674-75, 694 A.2d 93,98 (1996). 
255. According to Morin and Robinson, the question of whether lenders to EDEs merit 
BFP status will likely reach Maryland's appellate courts in the next two to three 
years. Morin Interview, supra note 13; Robinson Interview, supra note 97. If the 
changes to the PHF A recommended in Part V of this comment were to be adopted, 
however, BFP doctrine could be preserved as it is-with no need for judicial 
intervention. 
256. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. 
257. See supra notes 102-13 and accompanying text. 
258. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 317. Confession and avoidance is a 
form of pleading in which a defendant files an answer admitting the plaintiffs factual 
allegations but arguing that these facts, when combined with additional facts adduced 
by the defendant, are insufficient to prove that the plaintiff has a valid legal claim 
against the defendant. See generally 61 A AM. JUR. 20 PLEADING § 296 (1999). 
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does in fact hold title to the home in question, it has fulfilled its 
obligation to properly safeguard its own interests. 259 Once again, the 
strong likelihood that any institution lending (albeit, unwittingly) to 
an EDE or affiliate thereof will only lend within existing equity 
looms large. It enables a lender for value to plausibly argue that the 
existence of an outstanding mortgage on the securing property need 
not elicit any further inquiry on its part because it does not pose any 
threat to its interests. If there is sufficient equity to cover the loans 
extellded by both the first mortgagee and the subsequent one (the one 
unknowingly lending to the EDE), then the latter lender can in fact 
contend that once it ascertains through a record search that the party 
to whom it has lent funds does possess title to the securing property, 
its inquiry duties have been fulfilled. 260 
The foregoing argument is not, at first glance, ethically edifying. 
In effect, the lender would be arguing that facial suspiciousness aside, 
so long as it has effectively looked after its own interests, it has done 
what it must in order to earn protection as a BFP. In fact, the 
traditional void title versus voidable title261 distinction provides some 
support for this position. When title to real property has been 
fraudulently acquired in a manner that the victim could have 
prevented, the swindler gets "voidable title" which is ratified or 
"annulled" once it passes for value to a party without knowledge of 
the fraud. 262 The party without knowledge is then protected as a BFP 
because whereas the initial victim did have some power to prevent 
the fraud, the BFP may have had only limited ability to even discover 
the fraud. 263 
A victim homeowner's attorney seeking to quiet title could aver 
that notice of an outstanding mortgage gives a subsequent lender 
constructive notice of an at best questionable transfer of ownership 
from the victim to the EDE. The lender's advocate could counter this 
by pointing out that the victim homeowner nonetheless had the ability 
259. GORDON, supra note 50, at 1126. 
260. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-311(e) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
261. "Void title" carries with it neither remedy nor a duty to perform, as the transaction in 
question is not legally binding from the start. Examples of transactions that are void 
include ones that contradict statute, violate public policy, run afoul of laws, or 
contain uncertain or indefinite terms. A "voidable title" is one where a party has the 
power to avoid the legal relations created by a contract. Specific reasons to avoid a 
contract include infancy, fraud, mistake, duress, and some kinds of illegality. I 
SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § I :20 (Richard A. Lord ed., 
Thomson West 4th ed. 2007). 
262. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note II, at 1605. 
263. See Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 404, 250 A.2d 69,76 (1969). 
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to prevent the fraud and failed to do so and must, therefore, bear the 
burden traditionally assigned by voidable title doctrine. Further, the 
lender could reason that the only thing a still-outstanding mortgage 
really demonstrates is that the original homeowner failed to convey 
title on favorable terms. Surely, the lender could conclude, it is not 
the lender's job to ensure a good deal for some homeowner with 
whom it has no privity relationship. 
The legal battle will be intricate, interesting, and quite uncertain in 
its outcome until Maryland's highest appellate court issues a 
precedent-making decision. Part V.C of this Comment, however, will 
suggests a change to the PHF A that would, if adopted, render the 
foregoing discussion moot in a manner favorable to victimized 
homeowners seeking clear title to their homes. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Exemptions in the PHFA 
The PHF A does not explicitly define the term affiliate; thus the 
reach of its exemptions of several different classes of professionals 
opens the door to possible abuse. 264 This opening may be somewhat 
narrow, but it is an opening nonetheless. 
For example, let us say that a real estate broker, operating as an 
EDE, facilitates the transfer of title to a number of properties in 
foreclosure to several different parties. Most or all of these parties 
eventually sell the properties they have acquired at a handsome 
profit. In doing so, they employ the real estate broker in question and 
pay him generous commissions. Are these third party purchasers 
affiliates of the broker? Should the EDE be estopped from claiming 
that they are not affiliates? To answer the latter question, we would 
presumably have to examine the terms of the contracts by which title 
was transferred, as well as any opportunities the distressed 
homeowners had to reacquire title under these contracts. We would 
also need to look at the totality of the dealings between the broker 
and the third parties. At the same time, however, it would seem that 
if the terms under which the third parties gained title to the properties 
in foreclosure were substantively unconscionable, this would strongly 
suggest that these third parties should at least be considered affiliates 
of the broker; if they were not, the PHFA would not apply. 
The above scenario suggests that there might be an area of legal 
wiggle in which exempted parties may profit from dealings with 
264. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-301, 7-302(a)(3)(ii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006); see 
also supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
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homeowners in foreclosure, so long as any terms they convince the 
distressed homeowners to accept do not meet the standard of 
substantive unconscionability. One could argue that this is not, in 
itself, a bad thing. The PHF A's very lack of specificity in defining 
"affiliate" might be seen as opening a potentially salubrious space of 
contractual freedom within which experienced professionals, like real 
estate brokers and attorneys, can work with homeowners in 
foreclosure towards potential solutions that are mutually beneficial, 
including ones involving transfer of title. If any such professionals 
step over the line of propriety, the argument might conclude; then, 
common law remedies such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
unconscionability would provide legal recourse to any injured parties. 
Any merits of conceptual or ideological elegance that such an 
argument might present are more than offset by the actual 
circumstances in re~onse to which the PHF A was drafted and 
ultimately enacted. 26 The proliferation of FRF, both in Maryland 
and across the United States, should serve as compelling evidence 
that when interested parties approach homeowners in foreclosure 
purporting to offer assistance, the likelihood of these homeowners 
losing not only their homes but also most or all of the equity they 
have earned over time is far too high. 266 The number of victims that 
have fallen prey to EDEs across the country is far too high to accord 
with the implicit standards of equity of any society that subscribes to 
the rule of law. 267 Freedom of contract in cases involving distressed 
homeowners has, in practice, amounted to the freedom to profit 
inequitably at their expense. Given the disparities between many of 
these homeowners and the EDEs in terms of financial and legal 
literacy, psychological circumstances, and resources, any other 
outcome would be surprisin~. Law exists to ensure equity where its 
absence might threaten it. 2 It does not exist for the pu~ose of 
giving aid to those who would abuse the freedoms it secures. 69 The 
265. Alexander Gordon, IV, who helped draft the PHFA, expressed to present writer that 
the primary reason the aforementioned exemptions are in the statute in the first place 
is the pressure applied by interested industry lobbyists. While present writer does not 
know exactly which arguments they presented, it seems reasonable to suppose that 
the free market "opposing argument" presented above would be agreeable to them. 
See Gordon Interview, supra note 14l. 
266. See TRIPOLI & RENUAL T, supra note 4, at 17, 51. 
267. "Equity" is defined as "[t]he body of principles constituting what is fair and right; 
natural law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 11, at 579. 
268. See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 7 (Dean Russell trans., The Found. for Econ. 
Educ., Inc. 1950) (1853). 
269. See id. at 12. 
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PHF A's language limiting the exemptions it contains should, 
therefore, be strengthened. 
The only reason present writer recommends that this language be 
augmented, rather than recommending that the exemptions be 
eliminated altogether, is the belief that the latter option might not be 
politically viable. 27o If legislative will could, in fact, be mustered to 
eliminate these exemptions, this would be the better alternative. 
Apart from making inchoate intellectual grunts about the sanctity of 
freedom of contract, those who would argue to maintain exemptions 
are charged with the task of demonstrating that, if engaged in by 
someone in an exempted group, the actions proscribed by the PHF A 
are more likely to be beneficial to a distressed homeowner than they 
are to be harmful. Otherwise, why exempt anyone from the PHFA's 
authority? 
Such a contention would be a non-starter. It could be viewed that 
certain prohibited practices, such as accepting compensation for 
foreclosure consulting services before their performance has been 
completed, are not facially fraudulent. 271 Perhaps the exemption 
could be limited such that it applies only to these particular practices; 
potentially, this limitation could greatly reduce the chances of a 
vulnerable homeowner's being treated inequitably as a result of the 
statute's exceptions. 
If, however, the exemptions remain, the language limiting those 
exemptions should be strengthened. One way to do this would be to 
replace the current clause with one providing that any services that 
fall under the statute's definition of foreclosure consulting service. 272 
Any exempted party would then lose its status if it violated the rules 
binding non-profit organizations that deal solely with homeowners in 
foreclosure or loan default. In effect, such a clause would require 
those in exempted classes who purport to assist homeowners facing 
foreclosure to operate as non-profit entities when proffering and 
rendering this assistance. 
B. Felony Status 
Under Maryland law, a person who is convicted of theft of property 
or services valued at $500 or more is guilty of a felony.273 As we 
have seen, the PHF A provides that any person convicted of violating 
any of the statute's provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor and is 
270. See, e.g., Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81,93-94 (2002). 
271. See MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-307(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
272. ld. § 7-301(a). 
273. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-104(g)(l) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
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subject to a prison sentence of no longer than three years. 274 As of 
this writing, it is not entirely clear how the PHF A's criminal penalties 
provision would be applied in the case of an EDE accused of 
violating multiple clauses. Consider a scenario in which the state 
prosecutes an EDE for: (1) failing to adequately verify that a 
homeowner agreeing to a reconveyance possessed the means to meet 
its terms; (2) presenting to the homeowner a contract printed in 10-
point rather than 12-point type; (3) neglecting to provide a notice of 
rescission with the contract; (4) engaging in conduct intended to 
mislead the victim homeowner; and (5) retaining more than 18% of 
the proceeds from a subsequent sale of the victim's home that 
occurred within 18 months of the date on which she entered into the 
reconveyance agreement. 
Under such a scenario, would the EDE, upon conviction of all five 
violations, face a possible three-year sentence for each? Fifteen years 
in prison for someone who has willfully committed FRF seems 
facially just, but misdemeanor penalties, b~ and large, do not lend 
themselves to such lengthy incarcerations. 2 5 If, on the other hand, 
violations of the PHF A were prosecuted on a single-count basis with 
one three-year sentence for a person found guilty of violating 
multiple provisions, an EDE guilty of robbing a vulnerable 
homeowner of, say, $100,000 in hard earned equity could 
conceivably come away with a misdemeanor conviction and a 
particularly short prison sentence. 
The solution to this potential shortcoming of the PHF A is not 
simply to substitute the term felony for misdemeanor in the PHFA's 
criminal penalty provision. If violating any clause of the PHF A were 
a felony, any number of possibly innocent mistakes could then result 
in non-EDEs being branded as felons. 276 We do not want strict 
felony liability for someone who, in the course of a sincere attempt to 
help a distressed homeowner, accidentally uses ll-point type or 
forgets to provide a notice of rescission. At the same time, given 
how potentially destructive FRF can be to its victims, it does not 
appear that softening the PHFA's penalty section to remove the 
implication of strict liability would be a good idea. An EDE savvy 
enough to ply his pernicious trade could conceivably trick a jury into 
believing he did not really "intend" to violate the PHF A. As it is 
274. REAL PROP. § 7-321(a). 
275. A misdemeanor is a crime characterized by a penalty of a short term of confinement 
"in a place other than prison (such as a county jail)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note II, at 1020. 
276. REAL PROP. § 7-321(a). 
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already included in the PHF A, 277 the strict liability provision should 
therefore remain therein. 
Present writer's recommended solution is to incorporate 
Maryland's theft statute278 into the PHFA by reference. This could 
be done in terms of particular clauses that are already in the theft 
statute. For example, section 7-104 of the Criminal Article of the 
Maryland Code specifies unauthorized control over property by 
means of deception as one form of theft. 279 The definition includes: 
(1) obtaining control over the property of another by means of 
deception with the intent to deprive the owner ofthe property; and (2) 
using the property of another with the knowled~e that such use will 
"probably" deprive the owner of the property. 2 These are not the 
only acts included in the aforesaid definition, but for our purposes 
they are the most germane. 
As it is currently written, Maryland's theft statute arguably could 
be used to prosecute perpetrators of FRF at the felony level. Any title 
to the property that an EDE might have obtained has, as we have 
seen, almost certainly been gained by deceptive means. 281 It is, 
therefore, of little or no defense to theft for an EDE to claim that he 
cannot be accused of stealing what is, by contract, no longer owned 
by the victim homeowner. The use of a third party is also not a 
strong shield for an EDE. Even if a scam artist convinces someone to 
obtain title to the property at issue and then takes out a new mortgage 
on the remaining equity, the EDE remains a primary actor in the 
scheme. 282 
Under this scenario, the EDE has: (1) used deception in order to 
gain effective control over the victim's property because the third 
party is merely acting as the EDE's agent; and (2) used the property 
. in a way that is almost certain to deprive the distressed homeowner of 
it. In taking out a new loan secured by the house in question for the 
sole purpose of making off with the proceeds from that loan, the EDE 
has made use of that house for his own purposes. Further, this use is 
almost certain to eventually deprive the victim of her home because 
the EDE has no intention of ever paiEing off the loan. Why should he, 
since it is in the third party's name? 83 
277. See id. 
278. CRIM. LAW § 7-104. 
279. [d. § 7-104(b). 
280. See id. § 7-104(c)(l)(iii). 
281. See supra notes 37-137 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra notes 104-13 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra notes 40-133 and accompanying text. 
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Based on the foregoing, it is no stretch to suggest that the following 
language could be inserted into the PHF A's criminal penalty section: 
Any continuing course of conduct intended to deprive a 
homeowner in foreclosure, or one who has been in 
foreclosure at any point within six months prior to entering 
into a foreclosure consulting and/or reconveyance 
agreement, of any amount of the value of that person's 
home, will be considered "Unauthorized control over 
property--By Deception," pursuant to Maryland Criminal 
Code section 7_104. 284 
Such language would, in effect, treat any instance of FRF that 
accrues to the direct or indirect financial benefit of an EDE, or 
conversely, the financial detriment of the victim, as an act of theft. 
As such, if the amount of the deprivation reaches $500 or greater, it 
will be considered a felony.285 
There is no need for the existing language in the PHF A providing 
for misdemeanor penalties to be stricken. Rather, the language can 
be applied to violations of the PHF A that do not redound to the 
monetary detriment of the homeowner in question. A foreclosure 
consultant who fails, for example, to include a notice of rescission in 
a proffered contract, but does not otherwise harm the homeowner 
with whom he is dealing, ought not be branded a felon. Of course, 
any violation of the PHF A that is, by itself, a misdemeanor may ripen 
into a felony under the framework recommended herein. 
If, say, a foreclosure consultantlEDE were to innocently forget to 
include a notice of rescission in a reconveyance agreement presented 
to and signed by a homeowner facing foreclosure, this would, 
standing alone, constitute a misdemeanor. If, however, the 
homeowner later learns of his rescission rights under the PHF A and 
demands that the conveyance to the EDE or agent thereof be voided, 
only to be rebuffed by the EDE, a potential felony develops. If the 
EDE's conduct under this set of facts eventually causes the 
homeowner to lose $500 or more of the value of his home, then the 
initial misdemeanor has, in fact, mutated into a felony. Such a 
manner of criminal classification would be wholly consistent with 
extant language in Maryland's theft statute providing that in 
determining the monetary degree of the victim's deprivation, any 
284. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 7-104(b) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
285. See id. § 7-1 04(g)(l). 
154 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 37 
separate losses resulting from "one scheme" or "continuing course of 
conduct" will be "aggregated.,,286 
The revisions recommended in this subsection are intended to 
provide investigators and prosecutors who deal with FRF added 
enforcement potency and a measure of flexibility. Someone who rips 
off a desperate person for tens of thousands of dollars clearly merits 
the legal condemnation only felony sanctions can provide. At the 
same time, for reasons already discussed, not every violation of the 
PHF A needs to carry this degree of sanction. 
C. Voiding What Is Now Merely Voidable 
Strong enforcement of the PHF A will go only so far in preventing 
FRF from occurring. The likelihood that a significant number of 
victims will not seek legal recourse will continue to attract certain 
people to the ranks of the EDEs. Ending FRF in Maryland once and 
for all will require that we make it unprofitable. A powerful and 
simple change to the PHFA's BFP provision could achieve this. 
Instead of explicitly holding out the possibility that a buyer of, or 
lender on, an EDE-acquired property may be a BFP, the statute could 
state in clear and unambiguous terms that any foreclosure consulting 
contract or reconveyance agreement that in any way fails to conform 
to the PHF A breaks the chain of title to the property. In addition, the 
PHF A could include a provision that any violation of an otherwise 
valid foreclosure consulting contract or reconveyance agreement also 
breaks the chain of title. 
In other words, present writer recommends that any violation of the 
PHF A renders title to property conveyed pursuant to any activity 
covered by the statute void, rather than voidable. The last sentence of 
the preceding paragraph means exactly what it says. Any violation of 
the PHF A, even one that occurs after a financial institution has 
already lent money to an EDE or affiliate thereof, will break the 
chain of title. The title search that the bank or other lender undertook 
prior to the violation of the PHF A would thus be rendered useless. 
As counterintuitive as this might appear, it is necessary. 
Violations of the PHF A are likely to occur after-rather than 
before-the EDE has already secured loan proceeds on the existing 
equity. 287 If, for example, an EDE persuades a victimized 
homeowner to agree to a foreclosure reconveyance agreement and 
then takes out a loan secured by the property, the lender could argue 
that the EDE had not violated the PHF A until after the loan had been 
286. See id. § 7-103(f). 
287. MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 7-318 to -321 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006). 
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made. 288 The PHF A has only been violated, the lender could 
contend, when the EDE pockets the loan proceeds and leaves the 
victim to his fate. If this argument were to prevail in court, then the 
lender would be able to gain clear title to the victim's property as a 
BFP. This would defeat much of the purpose of the PHF A. 
The only way to ensure that no party who lends to an EDE or EDE-
affiliate gains BFP status, therefore, is to adopt the rule that any 
violation of the PHF A, by operation of law, voids any title transferred 
as part of a foreclosure consulting contract or foreclosure 
reconveyance. If the state legislature were to adopt this provision as 
part of the PHF A, it seems safe to say that the monetary well from 
which the EDEs have begun to drink would quickly become a desert. 
No lender is going to extend even a penny that is secured by a 
mortgage or deed of trust that could be rendered void at any time, by 
any violation of a statute that holds foreclosure "consultants" to very 
exacting and particular standards. Legitimate lenders would thus be 
taken out of the nefarious FRF equation altogether. 
While the foregoing proposal might be controversial, it would do 
far more good than harm. Even vigilant enforcement of the PHF A, as 
it is now written, will not deter all who would be EDEs.289 It seems 
reasonable to say that there are plenty of scam artists who to this day 
remain ignorant of the PHF A and thus undeterred by it. Similarly, 
while the PHF A's treble damages provision makes legal 
representation much more available to victim homeowners than it 
was before the PHF A's enactment,290 many victims will remain too 
depressed, desperate, fatigued, and uninformed to wage a lega~ battle 
against the EDEs. The best way to fight FRF is to prevent it from 
happening in the first place. Denying EDEs the option of stripping 
equity through mortgage loans would be a giant step in this direction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In an important way, the PHF A's principal strength is also a 
potential weakness. Its comprehensiveness, particularly in defining 
the extent of its scope, makes it terribly difficult for any EDE (except 
those in the exempted classes) to escape its coverage. The PHF A's 
substantive protections are similarly broad and thorough (except, of 
course, its BFP provision). One hopes that our success in combating 
FRF, or for that matter, any other significant form of fraud, is not 
288. See id. §§ 7-307(1 )-(7). 
289. Seeid.§7-319. 
290. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., REAL PROP. § 7-
320(c). 
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dependent upon our ability to heap clause upon clause and term upon 
term in an unceasing effort to match the criminals as they continue to 
find new paths around law and equity. 
A small number of simple, yet forceful, measures of the sort 
advocated in this Comment could go a long way toward stamping out 
FRF in the state of Maryland. One could argue that declaring an 
EDE's title void rather than voidable presents the risk of innocent 
parties being harmed. In fact, innocent parties are being harmed as 
you read this. The likelihood of anyone acquiring title in good faith 
from an EDE after this Comment's suggestions are enacted is much, 
much smaller than the chance that EDEs will continue to steal home 
equity from desperate people if the PHF A is not strengthened. 
One could also argue that this Comment does conceptual violence 
to the "void vs. voidable" distinction. Such a charge would be 
spurious. It is true the Comment advocates treating as void what is, 
strictly speaking, voidable title. The definitions of void and voidable, 
however, remain for the law to use as its purposes dictate. The law's 
task is to employ its concepts in the manner most conducive to 
fairness and equity. There is no legal or ethical justification for the 
law to willfully remain straitjacketed within abstractions of its own 
making. 
In sum, this Comment stresses conceptually economical preventive 
measures over elaborate enforcement mechanisms. Hopefully, those 
who object to the suggested means on free market grounds will 
recognize that the very simplicity of these means is, itself, market-
friendly. It will hopefully be fitting to end this Comment where it 
began-with an allusion to freedom of contract. The best, and most 
economically sensible way, to combat FRF in Maryland may well be 
to alter the rules of the BFP game slightly and let the marketplace do 
the rest. 
Seth Yaffo 
